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I. INTRODUCTION 
The world’s nations are reexamining governance in the face of globalization. 
Former Soviet block nations are trying to become democracies and privatizing 
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their economies. International institutions such as the World Bank1 are exerting 
pressure on developing nations to lay the necessary foundation for the rule of law 
through legal infrastructure and innovations in governance.2 Non-Governmental 
Organizations (“NGOs”), such as the American Bar Association’s Central 
European and Eurasian Law Initiative (“CEELI”)3 and United States Agency for 
International Development (“USAID”), 4  have funded projects to provide 
assistance with this process. Many of these projects recommend new institutions 
to resolve conflicts over rights, property, and the legacy of ethnic violence. All of 
these developments suggest the convergence of national governance systems. 
While much attention has focused on Eastern Europe and Central Asia,5 
South Korea, an established industrial economy, has quietly broadened and 
deepened its democracy,6 and is presently building new, innovative governance 
processes into its institutions.7 There is a paradigm shift under way in South 
Korea that is framed as public participation in governance. South Korea is 
building new processes for conflict resolution and civic engagement into its 
administrative law and practice. It is drawing on the experiences of other 
countries and adapting them to its cultural context. The Korean Peninsula is the 
next geographic region to face major challenges of democratization and 
privatization. The lesson that Germany teaches is that re-unification of North and 
South Korea is inevitable, and therefore, North Korea8 will likely inherit the 
governance systems that South Korea is building today.9 
 
1. Douglas Webb, Legal and Institutional Reform Strategy and Implementation: A World Bank 
Perspective, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 161 (1999). One observer notes that the World Bank’s charter 
precludes it from interfering with the politics of a member nation, but that administrative law and governance 
are seen as “neutral and technical” conditions for fostering economic growth. Tom Ginsburg, Japanese Law 
Symposium: Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 622 (2001). 
2. See Tamara Lothian and Katharina Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment, and Alternative 
Strategies of Development: Some Views from Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 101 (2003). 
3. The Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/ (last visited Feb. 7, 
2006). 
4. For reports on various USAID projects on democracy and governance, see USAID, About USAID, 
Publications, http://dec.usaid.gov/ demo_gov.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
5. Webb, supra note 1, at 161. 
6. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 585-87 (observing that, in Korea, the political environment changed 
dramatically in the mid-1990s as the result of democratization and constitutional reforms which created 
incentives for politicians to open up the policy process and adopt a new administrative procedure regime). 
7. Kyu Ho Youm, Freedom of Expression and the Law: Rights and Responsibilities in South Korea, 38 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 123 (2002) (describing massive statutory changes concerning freedom of the press, political 
rights, and civil liberties since 1987). 
8. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [hereinafter North Korea]. 
9. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 
199 (2001). But see Joongi Kim, North Korea: Legal Perspectives and Analyses: Essay: The Challenges of 
Attracting Foreign Investment into North Korea: The Legal Regimes of Sinuiju and Gaeseong, 27 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1306, 1311 (2004) (describing efforts by North Korea to establish special economic zones to attract 
international investment in Sinuiju and Gaeseong in which North Korea adopted a comprehensive legal 
structure similar to the Hong Kong precedent of one country but two systems that may presage a move toward a 
market-based economic system). 
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This article examines South Korea’s10 implementation of new governance 
processes, specifically, its growing use of conflict resolution and civic 
engagement. First, this article discusses definitions of legal infrastructure. 
Second, it addresses control over dispute-system design as a lens through which 
to examine new governance processes. Third, it discusses recent developments in 
the Korean Judicial and Executive branches. Lastly, it will address the 
connections between new governance processes and economic development in 
Korea. 
II. GOVERNANCE, LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE, AND NEW GOVERNANCE  
PROCESSES SUCH AS DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Governance occurs within the context of legal infrastructure, which includes 
both substantive and procedural elements.11 Legal infrastructure’s substantive 
elements include property and contract rights, individual economic freedom, and 
civil rights. Its procedural elements include the resources and institutions for 
enforcing rights and resolving disputes.12 These include not only public sector 
institutions, such as courts and administrative forums within local, regional, or 
national agencies, but also private and nongovernmental institutions that help 
address conflict. 
Most broadly, conflict resolution can happen in a court, through a government 
agency, in a quasi-public context, through a NGO, or in a private context. Traditional 
governance processes—such as rulemaking or adjudication—are ways of resolving 
conflict in the creation and enforcement of public law. Rulemaking is the quasi-
legislative collection of information to create a new rule, regulation, or guideline 
of general and prospective applicability. Adjudication is the retrospective 
examination of facts involving specific parties to determine rights in accordance 
with a legal standard, such as a statute or regulation. Both of these processes 
reconcile the conflicting interests of citizens and stakeholders with the public 
policy goals of elected officials as expressed in law. 
Conflict resolution can also happen through a variety of new governance 
processes. These processes are alternative quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative 
processes with a variety of names, including alternative or appropriate dispute 
resolution (ADR), consensus-building, dialogue, and deliberative democracy.13 
 
10. The Republic of Korea [hereinafter South Korea or Korea]. 
11. See Paul B. Stephan, Relationship of the United States to International Institutions: The New 
International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1555 (1999). 
12. Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to “Mission-Creep”: Defending the IMF’s Emerging 
Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 
156 (2002) (observing that the International Monetary Fund is concerned with property law, contract rights, 
judicial reform, and other market-facilitating legal and institutional arrangements partly as a result of the Asian 
Monetary Crisis of 1997 to 2000). 
13. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Tina Nabatchi & Rosemary O’Leary, The New Governance: Practices and 
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Increasingly, these alternative processes are becoming an essential feature of 
governance. The terms consensus-building, dialogue, and deliberative democracy 
tend to refer to quasi-legislative processes. They help government to engage 
citizens and stakeholders to identify policy preferences and set priorities that in 
turn are used to formulate rules, guidelines, and regulations. In the United States, 
new quasi-legislative governance processes include forms of deliberative 
democracy14 such as the 21st Century Town Meeting of AmericaSpeaks,15 e-
democracy, Public Conversations,16 participatory budgeting, citizen juries, Study 
Circles,17 and collaborative policymaking, among others.18 The term ADR most 
often refers to quasi-judicial processes that engage citizens and stakeholders in 
implementing and enforcing public law and policy. ADR includes various forms 
and models of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. All new governance 
processes permit citizens and stakeholders to actively participate in the work of 
government. 
Moreover, these processes are used increasingly at all levels and sectors of 
governance. They are a feature of the emerging international governance 
structures, as sovereign nations negotiate treaties that provide for conciliation and 
dispute settlement, followed by arbitration before new international courts. These 
processes have not been adequately studied in any of the contexts or sectors in 
which they are in use, and South Korea is no exception. South Korea is building 
these new governance processes into a variety of its government institutions, and 
creating both an opportunity and a need for participation by its citizens and civil 
society in the policy process. This, in turn, is changing both the nature of 
information available to government in making public policy choices and the 
likely range of outcomes in conflict resolution. 
III. CONTROL OVER DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN 
For purposes of this article, private conflict resolution is a new governance 
process conducted by someone other than a judge in the judicial branch of 
government, an administrative law judge, or a public servant in the executive 
branch of government. The outcomes of private conflict resolution vary with the 
context of the system in which the process occurs. Dispute system design is the 
 
Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547 
(2005). 
14. For descriptions of all these processes, see National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, 
www.thataway.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); see also Collaborative Governance Initiative of the Institute for 
Local Government, www.ilsg.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
15. See America Speaks, www.americaspeaks.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
16. See Public Conversations Project, http://www.publicconversations.org/pcp/index.asp (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2006). 
17. See Study Circles Resource Center, http://www.studycircles.org/en/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 
2006). 
18. See generally JOHN GASTIL, THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK (John Gastil ed., Jossey-
Bass 2005). 
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concept that dispute resolution occurs through a system of steps and rules for the 
process, where this system is the product of a conscious series of choices and 
subject to a wide variation of resulting designs. 19  Originally conceived as 
describing innovations in a collectively bargained grievance procedure (such as 
grievance mediation), the concept has broader applicability as a useful way to 
think about the design of new governance processes. 
There are three basic categories of parties with control over dispute system 
design: (1) private parties who jointly design the system for themselves; (2) one 
party who designs it unilaterally and uses superior economic power to impose it 
on the other party; and (3) third parties who design a system for the benefit of 
others who are the disputants.20 
An example of the first category of joint private ordering is when two parties 
design a system together, as is the case in private commercial international 
arbitrations. Similarly, in labor relations and collective bargaining authorized by 
law, there are repeat players—both unions and management. Together, they create 
an organic, self-regulating balanced system for labor mediation and grievance 
arbitration. These systems are generally seen as fair, useful, functional, and 
economically efficient. 
A second category of private ordering is where one party designs the system 
unilaterally. This is commonly used and is a growing practice in the United States. 
The unilateral design of a system is achieved through adhesive mandatory 
arbitration, in which one party designs an arbitration plan and imposes it through 
superior economic power on the other party. Under the Federal Arbitration Act and 
federal preemption, these are enforceable arbitration agreements with a limited 
scope of review. However, there are some unresolved problems with this form of 
private ordering, such as power asymmetries. Power asymmetries include to repeat 
players using their structural advantage in the process to achieve superior outcomes 
over one-shot players; for example, the individual employee who may only use 
arbitration once is a one-shot player.21 Alternatively, some one-party designs use 
voluntary mediation, and these designs pose less concern.22 
Finally, there is public institution-building, in which third parties design 
arbitration or mediation programs for use by disputants. These third parties are not 
parties to the actual arbitration or mediation, but they create additional means for 
dispute resolution. These processes are generally seen as fair and balanced. Often, 
third parties ensure that there is stakeholder and disputant participation or 
democratic forms of voice in the design process. 
 
19. WILLIAM URY, JEANNE BRETT, & STEVEN GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED (Jossey-Bass 
1989). 
20. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Control Over Dispute Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 
67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2004). 
21. Symposium, Self-determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 873, 874 n.5 (2002). 
22. LISA BLOMGREN BINGHAM, MEDIATION AT WORK: TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE CONFLICT AT THE 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (IBM Center for the Business of Government 2003). 
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As discussed below, Korea is in the midst of a dramatic growth in third-party 
dispute system design through initiatives by government. However, it has limited 
formal private ordering through joint or one-party dispute system designs. 
IV. RECENT MOVEMENTS TOWARD NEW GOVERNANCE 
PROCESSES IN KOREA  
This section will describe the backdrop for dispute resolution in Korea. It 
will also review innovations in progress in the judicial branch of government and 
then address innovations in the executive branch. This section will briefly 
examine the administrative law context for these innovations, discuss 
developments at the National Labor Relations Commission, examine proposals 
for a national model for public policy conflict resolution, and describe Korea’s 
first major environmental mediation case. 
A. The Backdrop for Dispute Resolution in Korea 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, Korea moved from a dictatorship to 
a vibrant and developing democracy, one that has flourished in the past decade. 
There was dramatic economic growth during this period, something that became 
known as the “Asian Tiger” phenomenon. However, vertically-integrated 
corporate conglomerates, called chaebol, dominated the economy. 23  These 
organizations were very closely held in point of fact, if not de jure. They were 
founded by families, and control of a chaebol either remained in the hands of the 
founder or passed to the second- and third-generation of the family.24  
An economic crisis in 1997-199825 was partly a function of dramatic leverage 
that the chaebol were able to obtain with a centralized and government-supported 
banking system.26 For example, these companies obtained a borrowing-to-assets 
ratio of 500% in 1997.27 The top thirty chaebol have overlapping boards of 
directors and stock ownership; total family ownership interests are 43% as a 
 
23. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 205-09. 
24. Id. at 206. 
25. Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project, Final Report and Legal Reform Re-
commendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 546 (2001). 
26. Craig P. Ehrlich & Doe Seob Kang, Independence and Corruption in Korea, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
1, 3 (2002) (arguing that a 2001 anticorruption law making it a crime for a public official to accept a gift in 
excess of 50,000 won had insufficient enforcement tools, and that the economic crisis of 1997 was partly a 
function of corruption as part of the relationship among the chaebol, the government, and the banks during 
decades of development from the 1960s to the 1990s). 
27. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 207 n.39. See also Hockett, supra note 9, at 175 (observing that the Asian 
Financial Crisis began when investors noted weaknesses in the financial system of South Korea and other Asian 
Nations consisting of weak regulatory oversight, huge, unhedged private short-term debt in foreign currencies, 
inadequately transparent corporate balance sheet data, corruption, and interlocking governments, banks, and 
firms); see also Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 26, at 28-29 (observing that banks continue to extend credit to 
manufacturers not capable of servicing their debt, and do so at the direction of the government). 
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function of cross-shareholding in the top thirty chaebol.28 In addition, these 
chaebol control 41% of the domestic economy, according to a 1995 study.29 
There is a cultural tradition of deference to authority from the Confucian era. 
This deference has an impact on how Korea will use dispute resolution. For 
example, it can inhibit party empowerment in mediation. Specifically, the 
Confucian tradition established a governmental meritocracy in which bureaucrats 
made decisions intending to build a better society and community. This is more 
consistent with quasi-judicial or arbitral decisionmaking. It is an autocratic, not a 
democratic, legacy for Korea. 
Moreover, the vertical concentration of power in the chaebol tends to 
suppress disputes. However, as a result of the financial crisis in the late 1990s, 
substantive laws gave more rights to shareholders, created more transparency, 
and ensured more accountability for the boards of directors of the chaebol.30 They 
also directly addressed cultural traditions of gift-giving that may appear as 
corruption and bribery under international norms. 31 These reforms tend to 
introduce more disputes as shareholders and members of the public obtain more 
information about chaebol board decisionmaking. The prospect of future 
reunification with North Korea gives added meaning to all law reform in South 
Korea. Some commentators nevertheless advocate continued reform of corporate 
governance.32 
There are also cultural forces that support the use of dispute resolution. 
Korea has a rich tradition of informal conciliation in communities and at the 
workplace that stems from its Confucian heritage.33 In this tradition, elders, 
superiors, and family clan members may informally intervene, without authority, 
to effect reconciliation because conflict disrupts the harmony of the community. 
This informal conciliation stresses both evaluative34 and directive mediation 
styles, as those terms are used in more recent U.S. literature.35 These de facto, 
informal mediators will not hesitate to tell both parties that the other is at fault, 
then chide, criticize, suggest solutions, educate, threaten, urge reconciliation, 
 
28. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 205. 
29. Id. at 205 n.27. The top 30 chaebols controlled 47.3% in 1995, 47.1% in 1996, 46.6% in 1997, 
47.1% in 1998, and 40.6% in 1999. See In-Hahk Hwang et al., Chaebol Structure and Policy, in INDUSTRY 
POLICY (KERI 2000). The top five chaebols controlled 26.3% in 1999. 
30. Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project, supra note 25, at 546; Ehrlich & Kang, 
supra note 26, at 1. 
31. Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 26, at 22-24. 
32. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 216-17; Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 26, at 6 (discussing failure of the 
2001 reforms to create the position of independent counsel with tenure or other independent investigative body 
to address charges of corruption and whistleblowing). 
33. Nam Hyeon Kim, James A. Wall, Jr., Dong-Won Sohn & Jay S. Kim, Community and Industrial 
Mediation in South Korea, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361 (1993); Dong-Won Sohn & James A. Wall, Jr., 
Community Mediation in South Korea: A City-Village Comparison, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 536 (1993). 
34. Kim et al., supra note 33, at 367-68, 371-73 (about the same for both community and workplace 
disputes); Sohn & Wall, supra note 33, at 541-42 (about the same for both city and village disputes). 
35. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (2d ed. 2003). 
2007 / Participatory Governance in South Korea 
 
382 
compromise in the interest of community harmony, and cap it off with 
considerable use of alcohol to enable face-saving communication.36 This cultural 
tradition is outside any formal dispute-system design. Any formal structures or 
social institutions for mediation practice that were in place as a result of the 
Confucian tradition appear to have been suppressed during the Japanese 
occupation of Korea in the first half of the twentieth century.37 
Korea does not have dispute resolution in the form of joint private ordering 
to the same extent as the United States. There is limited use of commercial 
arbitration.38 There is the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (“KCAB”),39 
which handles both domestic cases, defined as those involving parties with their 
principal offices or permanent headquarters in the Republic of Korea, and 
international cases, which are all others.40 Unlike arbitration rules of various U.S. 
third-party providers, such as the American Arbitration Association, 41 the 
arbitration rules of the KCAB are reviewed and approved by the Korean Supreme 
Court.42 The KCAB reported receiving and opening a total of 210 cases in 
2002—163 cases were domestic and 47 cases were international. From the 210 
cases, 167 went to an award, 35 were withdrawn, and 8 were stopped.43 The 
caseload appears stable. In 2003, the KCAB reported opening a total of 211 
cases—173 domestic and 38 international, where a total of 202 cases went to an 
award, 40 were withdrawn, and 7 were stopped.44 Generally, about four-fifths of 
the cases are domestic, and one-fifth are international.45 Among the international 
cases, the most common claims are non-payment, delayed shipment, contract 
cancellation, and unacceptable quality of goods.46 Korea adopted a version of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (“UNCITRAL Model Law”) in 1999, and 
named it the Korean Arbitration Act.47 Thus, in terms of legal infrastructure for 
international commercial arbitration, Korea is in the mainstream as a modern 
industrial economy. 
 
36. Kim et al., supra note 33, at 369. 
37. Id. at 366. 
38. Kwang-Rok Kim, How Do You Settle Business Disputes with Koreans?: The Advent of a New 
Amendment to the Korean Arbitration Act, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 227 (2002). 
39. See The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English (last visited Nov. 15, 
2005). 
40. Arbitration Rules of Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB), ch. 1, art. 2 (2004), www.kcab. 
or.kr/English/M6/M6_S2.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
41. See American Arbitration Association, www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (listing the various 
rules and protocols administered by the American Arbitration Association). 
42. Id. 
43. These are the most recent statistics on the KCAB website, reported at Korean Commercial 
Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English/ M5/M5_S4.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2006). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Kwang-Rok Kim, supra note 38, at 229-30; Arbitration Act of Korea (Amended by Act No, 6083 as 
of Dec. 31, 1999), www.kcab.or.kr/English/M6/M6_S1.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
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Korea makes very limited use of one-party dispute-system designs, such as 
mandatory commercial and employment arbitration, as those processes are used 
in the United States. While Korean credit card companies may be adopting the 
same language for arbitration as their U.S. peers, there is no equivalent of the 
Federal Arbitration Act to limit the scope of judicial supervision over abuses. In 
contrast, the Korean Arbitration Act allows courts broad discretion to set aside 
awards that are contrary to Korean law or public policy.49 
Korea does not have a tradition of independent mediation practice.50 The 
KCAB offers mediation services as well as commercial arbitration services.51 It 
mediates using members of its staff as neutrals, provides its services free of 
charge, and generally conducts mediation by telephone or correspondence, 
 
48. One-party dispute system design is permitted under the Arbitration Act of Korea § 8 (3). One use 
concerns disputes among credit card companies, stores, and customers regarding a customer’s use of a credit 
card. Personal communications with staff members of LG Card Co., Ltd. (January 31, 2006). 
49. The Arbitration Act of Korea provides as follows: 
Article 36 (Application for Setting Aside Award to Court) 
(1)  Recourse against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside 
to a court. 
(2)  An arbitration award may be set aside by the court only if: 
1.  The party making the application furnishes proof that: 
(a)  a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity under the law 
applicable to him; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the 
parties have subjected it, or failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
Republic of Korea; or 
(b)  a party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of 
the arbitrator or arbitrators or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case; or 
(c)  the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope 
of the submission to arbitration. If the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration 
can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which 
contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or 
(d)  the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure were not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict 
with any provision of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate or, failing 
such agreement, were not in accordance with this Act; or 
2.  The court finds on its own initiative that: 
(a)  the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of the Republic of Korea; or 
(b)  the recognition and enforcement of the award is in conflict with the good morals or 
other public policy of the Republic of Korea. 
(3)  An application for setting aside the award shall be made within three months of the date 
on which the party making that application has received the duly authenticated award or, 
if a request has been made under Article 34, the duly authenticated copy of a correction 
or interpretation or an additional award. 
50. Kwang-Taeck Woo, A Comparison of Court-Connected Mediation in Florida and Korea, 22 
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 605, 608 (stating that “[v]oluntary mediation by parties’ agreement without court 
intervention was available, but very rare. Accordingly, mediation in Korea is generally a court-connected 
procedure in which the court intervenes and leads.”). 
51. See Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English/M3/M3_S1.asp (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2006). 
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although in-person mediation is available.52 Unlike the United States, mediation 
settlements reached with the assistance of the KCAB are not legally binding, but 
the KCAB reports that most settlements are implemented voluntarily.53 It reports 
that in 2002, it opened 470 domestic and international mediation cases, which 
were divided roughly in half between the two categories.54 In 2003, it opened 451 
cases.
55
 The KCAB reports that the majority of international mediation cases 
involve non-payment, delayed shipment, and unacceptable quality of goods, in 
that order of frequency.56 
Thus, Korea has both the legal infrastructure and the institutional capacity for 
private dispute resolution in the form of commercial arbitration and mediation. 
Nevertheless, in light of Korea’s status as the eleventh largest economy in the 
world,57 with a population of 48 million people58 and a relatively low reported 
caseload in mediation and arbitration for commercial disputants, it would appear 
that private dispute resolution is not yet fully institutionalized in Korea. 
In contrast, the United States has experienced dramatic growth in party-
initiated private ordering and dispute system design. One case is particularly 
illustrative: the development of the Center for Public Resources (“CPR”) 
Institute. For a period of time, there was a growing phenomenon of Fortune 500 
companies suing each other.59 In-house counsel at these companies decided they 
needed to reduce their litigation budgets for outside counsel. As a result, these 
companies joined forces to create CPR, which became the CPR Institute, and 
they created the CPR Pledge in which they agreed to adopt a policy of using 
ADR before resorting to the courts.61 Private companies have certain formal 
dispute resolution systems, such as labor-management committees, collective 
bargaining, and related grievance procedures that provide due process. However, 
in Korea, there are cultural understandings and integration of businesses that 
suppress disputes among the chaebol. Moreover, there appears to be no formal 
dispute-system design governing disputes within the chaebol group. 
At present, there is limited curriculum on negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
and dispute resolution in law departments, public administration programs, and 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Mediation Statistics of the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English/M5/M5 
_S4.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
55. Id. The KCAB does not report settlement rates for its mediated cases. 
56. Id. 
57. Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project, supra note 25, at 550. 
58. Hoyoon Nam, U.S.-Style Law School System in Korea: Mistake or Accomplishment?, 28 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 879, 880 (2005). 
59. Marc Galanter, Contracts Symposium: Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May 
Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577 (2001). 
61. See International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, www.cpradr.org/CMS_disp.asp? 
page=Abt_Began&M=1.3 (last visited Jan. 2, 2006). 
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business schools.62 As a result, there is no substantial institutional infrastructure 
for negotiation or dispute-resolution training. There are no established 
professional associations or obvious sources of trained mediators, although there 
is a roster of arbitrators maintained by the KCAB. These are challenges for 
implementing private dispute resolution. 
There is limited one-party dispute system design activity in South Korea. It 
stands to reason because this is a culture with more collectivist than individualist 
traditions. Until recently, there was a tradition of lifetime commitment to the 
employment relationship. In personal communications with government officials 
and law professors, there was a universally negative response to the prospect of 
mandatory, adhesive arbitration clauses. Interviewees expressed considerable 
concern about corruption in decisionmakers. Interviewees reported that they have 
no equivalent to the Federal Arbitration Act, which limits judicial review over 
arbitration awards,63 nor did they believe it likely that there would be any 
innovation in legal infrastructure that would permit this kind of adhesive use of 
arbitration in Korea.64 In contrast, a recent study in the United States found that 
one-third of the market basket of goods and services in greater Los Angeles, 
California, incorporate adhesive arbitration clauses designed unilaterally by the 
corporate, institutional party.65 
In contrast to the limited private ordering in Korea, there is exciting 
innovation by government in institutional legal infrastructure for dispute 
resolution. This constitutes third-party dispute-system design because the 
government is designing systems for the use of the public and disputants. This is 
part of a larger paradigm shift that the government has framed as democracy-
building and public participation.66 Executive branch agencies and institutions are 
already engaging in activities to implement these new governance processes, 
anticipating an executive order.67 The process under discussion essentially builds 
dispute resolution into governance by allowing the engagement of citizens and 
stakeholders in governmental decisionmaking processes. However, there are 
limited institutions and infrastructure to support dispute resolution. For example, 
 
62. Personal communications with faculty members at Yonsei University Department of Public Admin-
istration (September 26, 2005); at Yonsei University Department of Law (September 27, 2005); and at 
Sungkyunkwan University Business School (September 28, 2005). These universities are in the top five 
nationwide. 
63. For a review of interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act, see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory 
Arbitration: Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004). 
64. For a review of the state of mandatory arbitration in the United States, see Thomas B. Metzloff, 
Foreward: Mandatory Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2004). 
65. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004).  
66. The current president was a public interest advocate who sympathizes with the labor union 
movement. He is a one-term president trying to change the culture for citizen involvement and public 
participation as his political legacy. This creates a unique window for change. 
67. Executive Order for Managing Conflicts in Public Administration (pending legislation). 
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there is no professional body of mediators in dispute resolution practice. A new 
center for dispute-resolution training in the executive branch is systematically 
benchmarking the best practices of other countries. South Korea is a knowledge 
economy. It has bootstrapped its way up the world economic ladder through 
education and the development of human capital. The government will 
benchmark ways to build conflict resolution capacity. 
B. The Judicial Branch: The Korean Supreme Court and ADR 
Disputes in the civil justice system in Korea differ greatly from that in the 
United States. The legal profession is small and elite. Legal education does not 
take place in graduate schools, as in the American model; instead, there are 
undergraduate law departments with a first degree in law, similar to the European 
model and what was formerly prevalent in Japan.68 Professors in these law 
schools have graduate degrees in law, but most have not practiced law or been 
admitted to the bar.69 Those with undergraduate law degrees or those who read 
the law, but have no formal training, are eligible to take the sabubshihum, the 
Korean equivalent of the bar exam.70 Fewer than 1000 people, about 1% of the 
test-takers, pass it each year, and as a result, there is one lawyer in Korea for 
every 4800 people.71 In contrast, in the United States, there is one lawyer for 
every 300 people.72 
Upon passing the sabubshihum, prospective lawyers receive two years of 
additional training at the Judicial Research and Training Institute (“JRTI”), 
mostly from professors who are judges or prosecutors.73 Although lawyers in 
private practice enjoy great prestige and high incomes, there are some lawyers 
who claim not to have sufficiently lucrative work.74 On the other hand, there is 
concern that the small number of lawyers limits access to justice. 75  The 
government will be experimenting with a set of reforms to provide graduate 
education in law combined with easing the standards for admission to the bar in 
order to improve access to justice, permit lawyers to specialize, and ensure that 
lawyers have a broader general education.76 
 
68. Nam, supra note 58, at 33. 
69. Id. at 913. 
70. Id. at 885-86 (describing three phases: (1) a multiple choice exam on civil, constitutional, and 
criminal law, and on English, as well as one elective from criminal policy, international law, international 
transactions, intellectual property, economy law, labor law, legal philosophy, and tax; (2) an essay examination 
on administrative law, civil law, civil procedure, commercial, constitutional, and criminal law, and criminal 
procedure; and (3) an interview covering ethics, specialized knowledge, communication skills, manner and 
attitude, and creativity and perseverance). 
71. Id. at 879-80. 
72. Id. at 880. 
73. Id. at 888. 
74. Id. at 902. 
75. Id. at 916. 
76. Id. at 895-96 (describing the Korean Supreme Court Judicial Reform Committee’s Law School Plan, 
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Korea is beginning to move from a civil code tradition toward a common law 
system. The Korean Supreme Court will be supervising an experiment with the 
jury system.77 The judicial branch has created and will soon implement a virtual 
courtroom, in which the courts can conduct full-scale civil trials over the Internet 
and through the use of video-teleconferencing. This is viewed as a move to make 
disputing more efficient. 
The Korean Supreme Court’s Task Force on Civil Justice Reform (the “Task 
Force”) is also undertaking a redesign of the entire national civil justice system to 
add new forms of ADR—specifically, mediation and arbitration. There will be 
one new national court-connected dispute system design. In the United States, we 
have allowed the thousand flowers to bloom; every state and federal court has its 
own dispute system design and there is wide variation.78 
At present, Korean judges supervise mediation.79 Judges may mediate upon the 
motion of a party or by court referral. Judges may mediate their own cases using a 
format similar to a judicial settlement conference, or they may appoint a three-
person mediation committee (composed of two neutral non-judge commissioners 
with special subject matter expertise and a judge who chairs); however, they will 
supervise the case carefully either way.80 The process resembles med-arb,81 in 
which a mediation process can turn into an adjudicatory one if the parties fail to 
reach a mutual settlement. The mediator-judge may issue an arbitration award that 
 
under review by a government committee of officials, legal scholars, practitioners, civic activists under the 
supervision of the Minister of Education and Human Resources Development). 
77. Personal communication with June Young Chung, Judge, Deputy Director General for Litigation 
Affairs and other members of the Korean Supreme Court Task Force on Civil Justice Reform, in Seoul, South 
Korea (Sept. 26, 2005); email from Jin-suk Chun, MPA and member of the Ministry of Education, Seoul, South 
Korea (on file with authors) (describing draft bill entitled “The Law of Public Participation in Criminal Justice,” 
drafted by the Commission of Legal System Reform and submitted May 16, 2005, which would implement a 
five to nine member criminal jury, the number varying with the seriousness of the charge). See also Civil 
Mediation Act § 7. 
78. For recent reviews of the literature evaluating various court-connected ADR designs in the United 
States, see Roselle Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55 (2004); and John Lande, Commentary: Focusing on Program Design Issues in Future 
Research on Court-Connected Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 89 (2004). Both articles are part of a double 
issue symposium that collects field and applied research on dispute resolution in seven substantive areas: courts, 
employment, education, community, victim offender reconciliation, family, and the environment. See 
Symposium, Conflict Resolution in the Field: Assessing the Past, Charting the Future, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 
1-320 (2004). 
79. Kwang-Taeck Woo, A Comparison of Court-Connected Mediation in Florida and Korea, 22 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 605 (1997) (describing processes in effect under the Civil Mediation Act, Law No. 4202 
(Jan. 13, 1990), amended by Law No. 4505 (Nov. 30, 1992), and Law No. 5007 (Dec. 6, 1995)). This law 
applies to civil mediation, but not family or labor mediation. Id. at 609. 
80. Id. at 613-15. 
81. Id. at 630. Mediation-arbitration, or med-arb, is a process in which the same neutral third-party first 
serves as a mediator, but if the parties reach an impasse, the mediator converts to an arbitrator to ensure a final 
and binding resolution of the dispute. The same neutral conducts two different ADR processes in sequence. For 
a discussion of the different ways mediation and arbitration can be combined, and of med-arb’s strengths and 
weaknesses, see COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 20-
30 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001). 
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is essentially advisory, where the parties may reject it within a limited time.82 
Moreover, the mediator-judge retains the authority to approve the reasonableness 
of any voluntary settlement or reject it, substituting his or her own judgment for the 
parties’ solution.83 There are concerns about confidentiality in this model, as is true 
with med-arb in the United States; specifically, the parties may be less forthcoming 
with a mediator who can use any information they share against them in the 
subsequent arbitration.84 Moreover, in Korea, mediation processes are open to the 
public.85 
Korea has seen a tremendous growth in caseload and a new willingness of 
individuals to file claims. Disputes are increasing in many different forums,86 
including against administrative agencies87 and in cases involving constitutional 
issues.88 During the period of Japan’s occupation of Korea, it had tremendous 
control over and influence on Korean law, to the extent that eventually proceedings 
had to be conducted in Japanese before Japanese judges. This made Koreans 
understandably reluctant to resort to the courts for redress of wrongs.89 However, 
since 1987 and the democratization of Korea, disputing patterns have changed; 
people are more willing to file claims.90 During the 1990s, the annual number of 
civil litigations filed in district courts (the first level of the Korean justice system) 
increased tremendously. For example, approximately 1.5 million cases were filed 
in 1991, whereas over 4 million cases were filed in 1998.91 This dramatic increase 
in caseload has led to the Korean Supreme Court’s consideration of a national 
private ADR system.92  
The Task Force is conducting research to establish its dispute system design. 
It is examining the training and qualifications of neutrals, whether mediators 
should be court employees or outsiders, who will pay the neutrals and how much, 
and how mediation agreements and arbitration awards are enforced. The court is 
reconsidering fundamental legal infrastructure. The question is: what forms of 
 
82. Woo, supra note 79, at 630. 
83. Id. at 629-30. 
84. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS, 
supra note 80, at 21-22. 
85. Woo, supra note 79, at 616. 
86. Id. at 609. 
87. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 618-19 (observing that although both Japanese and Korean societies have 
traditionally been seen as valuing consensus and avoiding courts, in 1995, Korean courts decided 214.9 
administrative cases per million persons while Japanese courts decided only 7.6 cases per million persons, and 
suggesting that this is related to administrative law reform). 
88. Woo, supra note 78, at 620-21. 
89. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 596-97. 
90. One study reports dramatic use of a new system for civil complaints and administrative litigation. Id. 
at 610. 
91. See Sahng Hyeog Ihm, Lawsuit Avoiding Tradition in East Asia and Reconsideration of it in Korean 
Society 6-7 (May 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
92. Personal communication with Sangjoon Kim, Judge, Deputy Director General for Planning and 
Coordination, Supreme Court of Korea, in Seoul, South Korea (July 26, 2004). 
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dispute resolution and what dispute system design will they build into the courts? 
This raises questions of the timing of dispute resolution, where to mediate, what 
rules to establish regarding confidentiality, the role other agencies, such as the 
National Labor Relations Commission, have in the enforcement of the outcomes 
of ADR, and whether there are other functions or services the court needs to 
fund. For example, the court will consider matters such as funding research and 
evaluation. In the United States, in contrast, such funding has mostly come from 
philanthropy. 
Korea’s innovation is a response to cultural changes, specifically, increasing 
prosperity and deepening democracy. The Task Force is engaged in the 
comprehensive work of dispute system design, and the result will provide private 
dispute resolution for all those engaged in civil litigation in South Korea. 
C. The Executive Branch: Administrative Law and the Bureaucracy in Korea 
As the result of almost half a century of occupation by Japan, Korea inherited 
a body of administrative law and practice that was built on a German model for a 
modern state.93 Under this civil code model, bureaucrats operated with substantial 
administrative discretion, and used informal administrative guidance to induce 
voluntary compliance by the regulated community under implicit threat of 
retaliation.94 They were insulated from meaningful judicial review by a judicial 
branch staffed with junior judges who lacked subject matter expertise and were 
trained in a system that acculturated them not to exercise independent 
supervision over the policy process.95 However, comparative law scholars have 
noted that Korea diverged in both law and practice from this common base, and 
now reflects administrative law infrastructure that fosters transparency, public 
participation, freedom of information, and meaningful judicial review.96 
As part of this process of both democratization and administrative law reform 
in the early 1990s, Korea implemented new mechanisms for voice, participation, 
and dispute settlement in the executive branch.97 Specifically, it adopted notice 
and comment processes not only for rulemaking, but also for legislative 
proposals, the great majority of which are drafted98 by government ministries.99 It 
created an Ombudsman to receive complaints about the administrative 
 
93. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 589-90. 
94. Id. at 593-94. 
95. Id. at 595-96. 
96. Id. at 615-22. 
97. Id. at 607 (describing the creation of a designated administrative court of the first instance, a 
provision eliminating the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and an Administrative Appeals 
Commission under the Prime Minister). 
98. Id. at 608. 
99. Id. at 607-08 (characterizing these processes as more open than notice and comment rulemaking in 
the United States because they apply to legislation as well as rulemaking). 
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bureaucracy from members of the public.100 It also created a National Grievance 
Settlement Committee under the Prime Minister to settle civil petitions.101 The 
government’s newest wave of innovation focuses on forms of dispute resolution, 
deliberation, and dialogue for both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative 
government functions. 
D. The Korean National Labor Relations Commission 
An example of mediation for quasi-judicial functions is the Korean National 
Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”),102 which is an independent commission 
responsible for the administration of national private sector labor law.103 There is 
approximately an 11% rate of private sector unionism in South Korea. 104 
Interviewees report that labor relations are increasingly adversarial. In the private 
sector, there are comprehensive bargaining units capable of shutting down an 
entire industry.105 
The NLRC is a quasi-judicial governmental body, composed of tripartite 
representatives of workers, employers, and those supporting public interests. It is 
affiliated with the Department of Labor. The NLRC conducts adjudications 
regarding unfair labor practices and unfair dismissal, and through its regional 
structure, executes special labor relations services like mediation and arbitration. 
The NLRC is considering improvements in governance to broaden its use of 
mediation and interest-based negotiation.106 Recent legislative reforms will permit 
national government workers to join unions for the first time107 and also create a 
right for temporary or contract workers to file complaints of discrimination.108 
These are changes in substantive law. These laws are part of an effort to give the 
private sector more flexibility in designing its workforce and hiring and firing 
 
100. Id. at 608. 
101. Id. 
102. See National Labor Relations Commission, http://www.nlrc.go.kr/en/en_index.html (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2006). 
103. Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 5310, arts. 53-61 (1997) (S. Korea), 
amended by Act No. 5511 (1998) & Act No. 6456 (2001), available at http://wwwdynamic-korea.com/archives/ 
view_archives.php?uid=200500003145&main=doc.  
104. In 2003, private sector unionization was 10.8%, and 22.5% out of full time employees have union 
membership, while temporary and contract workers had 1.5% and 0.4% respectively as of August 2004. See 
Korea Labor Institute, http://www.kli.re.kr/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).  
105. There are two influential bargaining units in Korea: the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(http://www.efktu.or.kr/~fktueng/); and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (http://www.kctu.org/). 
106. Personal communications with representatives from the National Labor Relations Commission, in 
Seoul, South Korea (Sept. 28, 2005). 
107. Public Officials Trade Union Act became effective on Jan. 28, 2006. Korean government 
employees have legally organized government workers’ unions. This act legalized unions for government 
workers.  
108. The Equal Employment Act guarantees employees the right to file complaints of sexual 
discrimination. However, it has been controversial in Korea whether temporary or contract workers are included 
under this Act. 
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workers. The Korea Tripartite Commission is responsible for issues of 
government employee unionization and temporary or contract workers. 
Nevertheless, the NLRC is anticipating a dramatic growth in caseload, in part 
related to these initiatives. 
The question is: how does one manage the growing caseload? The NLRC is 
examining system designs from other countries and considering the use of 
interest-based negotiation and mediation to address the anticipated increase in 
disputes. The chair of the NLRC holds rank of cabinet minister. The NLRC 
institutional structure includes a national office and regional offices in which 
there are professionals who serve as labor mediators and administrative law 
judges. The NLRC also mediates, arbitrates, and adjudicates.109 Interviewees 
report that the mediation style is very directive.110 As is common with labor 
mediators in the United States, NLRC mediators report that there is the usual 
head-knocking, arm-twisting, and reality-testing, in which the mediators give 
unions and management opinions on the appropriate outcome of a dispute.111 
Evaluative mediation is in some ways like advisory arbitration; the parties 
receive an outsider’s view of the strength of their best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement. This reality-testing serves as a means to get them talking again, a 
form of loop-back to negotiation. However, it sometimes simply reinforces an 
intransigent party who becomes convinced they can win on the merits. 
Interviewees report that NLRC mediators achieve high settlement rates. On 
December 31, 2005, the NLRC reported that its average rate of mediation success 
was 57.8%.112 
There may be a relationship between increasingly adversarial labor relations 
and democratization. As Korea opens up new mechanisms for voice through the 
discrimination statute on contract and temporary workers and through public 
 
109. The Labor Union and Employee Relations Act §§ 47-80. 
110. For a discussion of mediation styles, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE 
PROMISE OF MEDIATION 76-77 (2d ed. 2003). Evaluative mediators tend to listen to parties’ presentations on the 
merits of the dispute and provide an opinion on the value of the case or its likely outcome in court or before an 
administrative agency; they evaluate the case substantively. Directive mediators tend to assert control over the 
structure of the mediation process and to actively guide and direct the parties toward a resolution of the dispute, 
using various techniques to persuade or pressure the parties to settle. Transformative mediators do not have 
settlement of the dispute as their goal, but instead focus on providing the parties with opportunities for 
empowerment and recognition during the course of the process. Empowerment is enhancing the disputant’s 
sense of control and personal efficacy during the process. Recognition is where one disputant understands and 
acknowledges the perspective, values, or goals of the other disputant. It can take the form of an apology. A final 
form of mediation is facilitative. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL 
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (2d ed. 1996). This form of mediation helps the parties identify issues, 
their underlying interests and needs, and helps them brainstorm solutions to the dispute, generally using 
interest-based negotiation techniques. There is some ongoing discussion within the mediation community as to 
the boundaries between these models of practice. 
111. Personal communications with representatives from regional NLRC offices at the National 
Conference of the NLRC, Ritz Carleton Hotel, in Seoul, South Korea (Sept. 28, 2005). 
112. The National Office’s rate is 31.5%, and regional offices’ rates range from 44.4% to 82.6%, 
http://www.nlrc.go.kr/st/stmd_receipt.jsp (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
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sector collective bargaining, increasing numbers of employees may become 
willing to file claims. There may be a rich flowering of debate and controversy; 
some view conflict as a fundamentally creative force. 
The NLRC convened a national conference in September 2005 to benchmark 
dispute resolution programs in employment in the United States, and particularly, 
the REDRESS™ Program at the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”). This program is 
one in which there is comprehensive data and published empirical results. After 
the USPS adopted a mediation program for discrimination complaints, there was 
almost a 30% drop in administrative law judge adjudications of formal 
complaints of discrimination.113 Since 1997, the number of formal complaints of 
discrimination at the USPS has dropped from a high of 14,000 per year to 
between 8000 and 9000 per year. A multivariate regression indicated that the 
drop correlated with the introduction of the mediation program over an eighteen-
month period in eighty-five different zip code areas. 
There are questions as to whether this program provides a useful model for 
the NLRC. The REDRESS™ Program uses the transformative model of 
mediation, one that is not evaluative or directive.114 It requires a different type of 
training for the mediators; training that is not readily available in South Korea. 
Interviewees were exploring training in both interest-based negotiation and 
mediation. This again raises the question of what institutional infrastructure is 
necessary to support expanded use of private dispute resolution in Korea. 
E. The Executive Branch and Public Participation 
The public participation theme is manifest in yet another initiative: the  
National Conflict Resolution System.115 This initiative of the Korean presidency 
will take the form of either an executive order or draft legislation. The proposal is 
to build a three-stage dispute resolution procedure into all South Korean national 
government agencies that are responsible for development projects or the 
management of conflicts over public policy. The three stages are a conflict 
impact assessment, deliberative polling in selected appropriate cases, and multi-
stakeholder mediation. The proposal places an emphasis on civic engagement 
and public involvement or participation. The conflict impact assessment would 
determine the adverse consequences of not resolving the conflict. The Korean 
Environmental Institute is likely to be tasked with performing the conflict impact 
assessments; it does all the environmental impact statements for major 
government actions in Korea. It consists of approximately 120 researchers who 
 
113. Lisa Blomgren Bingham & Mikaela Cristina Novak, Mediation’s Impact on Formal Complaint 
Filing: Before and After the REDRESSTM Program at the United States Postal Service, 21 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL 
ADMIN. 308 (2001). 
114. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 109. 
115. Sun Woo Lee et al., National Conflict Resolution System, Presidential Commission for Sustainable 
Development (2004). 
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are trained in economics and the natural and environmental sciences. One role 
this agency could and should undertake is collecting data on all environmental 
and public policy cases in which conflict resolution processes are used. There is 
precedent for this as the U.S. Institute of Environmental Conflict Resolution 
collects this data nationwide.116 
The notion of a conflict impact assessment contrasts with a conflict 
assessment, which is the practice in multi-stakeholder consensus-building and 
dispute resolution processes in the United States. A conflict assessment serves 
more of a convening function to determine who the parties are, who should be at 
the table, how are they are going to structure the process, and whether it is 
reasonable to mediate the dispute or conflict.117 
The second step, deliberative polling, is viewed as a means of conflict 
prevention or avoidance. In deliberative polling, the government convenes a 
representative sample of the electorate to deliberate on the public policy problem 
giving rise to the dispute.118 Impartial policy experts are available to answer 
questions and provide information. Citizens then deliberate and discuss the 
policy issues before they vote on their policy preferences. In the United States, 
voting is done by using information technology, including hand-held digital 
voting devices keyed with the citizen’s demographic information. The voting 
results are tabulated and incorporated into a statistical report including 
demographics. The report then becomes critical information for policymakers to 
use for informed decisionmaking. In the Korean legislation, the third step is 
conflict resolution through a mediation process. 
Executive branch agencies are moving to implement dispute resolution 
processes. Government agencies have started to develop their own conflict 
resolution systems. The executive branch has established a training initiative for 
government officials. 
The executive branch is learning how to build a dispute resolution practice 
infrastructure. The government commissioned the Korean Development Institute 
School of Public Policy and Management and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology to conduct a comparative conflict resolution studies conference to 
help South Korea examine how to build a mediation profession by looking at 
how the profession emerged in the United States, Europe, and Japan. The 
conference also examined the role of legal infrastructure in the form of enabling 
statutes, the emergence of professional organizations, the contributions of the 
 
116. See U.S. Institute for Conflict Resolution, www.ecr.gov (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). For 
information on the national evaluation study, see http://www.ecr.gov/ multiagency/program_eval.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
117. See MOORE, supra note 110, at 81-160. See also E. FRANKLIN DUKES, MARINA A. PISCOLISH & 
JOHN B. STEPHENS, REACHING FOR HIGHER GROUND IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TOOLS FOR POWERFUL 
GROUPS AND COMMUNITIES (Jossey-Bass 2000). 
118. See generally The Center for Deliberative Democracy, Deliberative Polling: Toward a Better 
Informed Democracy, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary (last visited Feb. 2, 2006) (describing 
deliberative polling). 
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academic community, and the necessary support for researchers. Much work lies 
ahead for Korea to successfully implement and institutionalize these new 
governance processes. 
F. Environmental and Public Policy Disputes 
There has been one significant environmental and public policy mediation 
case in South Korea: the Han Tan River Dam Project. The two mediators, Dr. 
Chin-Seung Chung and Dr. Sun Woo Lee, were leaders in the public 
administration academy. The new governance process was applied to the Hantan 
River Dam Conflict as an exemplar.  
In 1996, 1998, and 1999, there were serious floods in the lower Imjin River 
areas. The Korean government decided a dam construction was necessary to 
prevent future flooding.119 Two-thirds of the Imjin River and its watershed are 
under the occupation and control of North Korea. Thus, the government had to 
find an alternative that would enable flood prevention because it could not 
control the Imjin River. The Hantan River is the biggest of the Imjin River 
tributaries, so the government thought the Hantan River might be the second best 
option to control the Imjin River flood. However, the proposal to construct the 
Hantan River dam created a great deal of conflict involving several parties. 
There were five parties: (1) the Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
(“Ministry”); (2) the Korea Water Resource Corporation (“KWRC”) which 
together with the Ministry was in charge of dam construction; (3) people living in 
the Dam site and downstream (“PD”); (4) people living in the upper stream area 
of the Hantan River Dam site (“PU”); and (5) NGOs for environmental 
movements. The parties had different interests in the dam. Seemingly, the 
Ministry, KWRC, and PD were in favor of dam construction, while the PU and 
NGOs were opposed. However, the construction of the dam was very important 
to the Ministry and the KWRC for their organizational survival because their 
orientation toward developing national land was criticized. In response to this 
criticism, the government cancelled its plan to construct a dam a couple of years 
before the Hantan River Dam conflict occurred. The PD wanted an early decision, 
regardless of dam construction, because they suffered from restrictions on their 
property rights during the period of uncertainty. The PU opposed the dam due to 
the side effects after dam construction120 as well as for political reasons.121 The 
 
119. Sun Woo Lee, Chin-Seung Chung & Soo Sun Park, Study on the Mediation Process of the Hantan 
River Dam Conflict, Presidential Commission for Sustainable Development (2005). 
120. In fact, they did not have to worry about the side effects because the dam was designed to contain 
water for less than fifteen days a year, only when there was a warning of possible flooding. In another sense, the 
Hantan River Dam was designed as a so-called flood-controlling dam, in order to avoid the negative effects 
brought about by a multi-purpose dam. THE KOREAN ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT ON HANTAN RIVER DAM (2001). 
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NGOs were against any dam, as this would oppose their mission statement and 
philosophy.  
There were four serious obstacles to mediation. First, there was not enough 
data on the amount of flooding in the Imjin River, and no way to measure it, 
because the great majority of the river was in North Korea. Second, local 
elections of the PU made mediation difficult because political candidates locked 
themselves into positions opposing the dam. Third, there were communication 
problems and intransigence. For example, a common communication problem 
involved a first party raising an issue and a second party providing a solution, but 
the first party refused to accept the solution due to stubbornness. In effect, the 
first party lacked confidence and trust in the second party, and maintained an 
unmoving stance on all issues. Fourth, PU representatives had different interests 
in participating in the mediation process. Some wanted to build their political 
reputation, while others made efforts to get more benefits for their communities. 
The mediation began five years after the conflict began. The mediation team 
consisted of two professional mediators—one interpersonal conflict resolution 
skills trainer and one representative from the NGOs. The mediation process 
started in February 2004. There were thirteen pre-mediation sessions between 
February and May 2004, and sixteen mediation sessions between June and 
August 2004.122 During the premediation sessions, mediators tried to uncover the 
causes and interests of the parties regarding the conflict and to explain the 
mediation process to the parties. In doing so, the mediators helped convince the 
parties to implement the process, so that members of each party understood and 
participated in the mediation process. The mediation process consisted of four 
steps: (1) creating a set of ground rules; (2) finding causes; (3) developing 
alternatives; and (4) building consensus and agreement. The creation of ground 
rules contributed to building mutual trust among conflicting parties. 
Mediators worked with the parties until they agreed that the mediation goal 
was to determine how to prevent flooding in the lower Imjin River area. Out of 
seven issues,123 the most important and controversial issue was to assess the 
amount of floodwater that would be controlled by the Hantan River Dam. Neither 
party had superior scientific and technological methods to calculate this amount 
and its effects on the Imjin River flood. The failure to assess the amount of 
flooding that the Hantan River Dam would control made it difficult to develop 
alternatives. 
 
121. There were two local elections at the end of April and October. Political candidates tried to take 
advantage of the community opinion against the dam construction, encouraging people’s psychological 
opposition. It made the mediation very difficult. Lee et al., supra note 119. 
122. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON THE HANTAN RIVER 
DAM CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESS (Feb. 2005). 
123. There were seven main issues: legitimacy of decisionmaking on the dam construction; the amount 
of flooding in Imjin River; the amount of the flood controlled by the Hantan River Dam; environmental effects; 
cost-benefit analysis; safety; and tourism. Lee et al., supra note 119. 
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In order to advance the mediation process from finding causes to developing 
alternatives, the mediation team launched into a two-day overnight session. On 
one hand, mediators emphasized that the parties should raise questions and 
doubts on the basis of scientific, empirical, and rational arguments. On the other 
hand, mediators persuaded the parties that they also had to accept answers to 
these questions and explanations responding to these doubts on the basis of 
scientific and empirical information. Mediators emphasized that the most 
important thing was not measuring the flood amount, but finding alternatives to 
prevent the Imjin River from flooding. Through the two-day overnight session, 
parties developed five alternatives, one of which was to construct the Hantan 
River Dam. The parties then worked together to come to a consensus on the best 
one out of the five alternatives. However, the Ministry, KWRC, and the NGOs 
each argued for using their own tools to evaluate the alternatives. A three-day 
overnight session was scheduled to overcome this obstacle to agreement. 
Eventually, the parties realized that it was difficult for them to evaluate the 
alternatives by themselves. The stakeholder groups insisted that they could not 
reach a mutual, voluntary agreement. They asked the mediators to decide. This is 
consistent culturally with Korea’s authoritarian tradition. In an authority 
structure, disputants are acculturated not to take responsibility for their own 
decision to settle. The stakeholders said they all agreed to live with the decision 
of the mediators. The parties requested that the mediators select one of the five 
alternatives within a one-month timeframe. The parties committed to each other 
and to the mediators that they would accept the mediators’ decision with no 
objection. Members of each party approved the agreement on these rules, which 
essentially turned the mediation into an arbitration process. This concluded the 
mediation. 
The mediators next played the role of arbitrators, issuing a final decision. 
Three parties accepted the decision, but one of the stakeholder groups, the PU, 
reneged and appealed the decision to an office within the executive branch that 
functions similarly to the Inspector General in the United States. That office 
referred the case to the Prime Minister’s office. The Prime Minister’s office 
endorsed the decision of the mediators-turned-arbitrators. 
This was Korea’s first experience with a large-scale environmental 
mediation. This illustrates the challenges that lay ahead for institutionalizing 
these new governance processes in Korea. Not only is there a need to build the 
infrastructure for practitioners, but also users must learn how to participate 
effectively in these new processes. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNANCE PROCESSES IN KOREA 
These developments have broad implications. They are viewed as legal 
infrastructure to support continuing economic development. However, the longer 
term implications concern possible reunification with North Korea. New 
governance processes can play an important role in Korea’s continuing evolution. 
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A. Dispute Resolution and Economic Development 
Why is the South Korean government embarking on this ambitious program 
of dispute system design? One motivation has to do with the economy and 
economic development. One commentator has made a convincing argument that 
the previous wave of administrative law reform in the 1990s was a function of 
Korea as a ‘‘developmental state’’; that is, a state that “directed economic growth 
using a variety of activist mechanisms, rather than simply providing an enabling 
environment for capitalism as required by liberal ideology.”124 Using principal-
agency theory from political economy, it is argued that Korea’s administrative 
law reforms were designed to provide avenues for out-of-power political players 
to influence the policy process because no one party had a lock on re-election or 
control over the government.125 This in turn made it possible for the private 
sector, NGOs, and citizens to have more voice in the policy process. 
While the jury is still out, there is a growing body of empirical evidence 
relating democratic legal infrastructure and the civil justice system to economic 
growth.126 There appears to be an underlying motivation for dispute resolution 
reforms in Korea. For example, in the court system, although the legislative 
mandate for juries is framed as public participation in governance, what seems to 
be motivating the dispute system design includes a concern about transaction 
costs, the economic efficiency of disputes, economic competitiveness, and 
caseload growth. The Task Force is interested in the research of Marc Galanter 
on what he has termed the “vanishing trial.” His work finds that there is a 
decrease over the past two decades both in the absolute number of jury trials and 
the trial rate (from 12% to 2%) in U.S. federal district courts.127 He suggests that 
one of the explanations for these results may be the institutionalization of dispute 
resolution. 
Similarly, the work of the Korean National Labor Relations Commission 
appears to have an underlying economic rationale. Interviewees indicated that 
they face changes in substantive legal infrastructure concerning individual 
worker job security. Korea is moving toward more flexible hiring and firing. 
There were major layoffs in the last fiscal crisis. The political quid pro quo for 
increased labor-market flexibility is the new statute prohibiting discrimination 
against temporary and contract workers; the new legal infrastructure also 
authorizes the opportunity to file more claims, which could increase the 
administrative case docket of the NLRC. There is a need to make government 
and public law work efficiently to avoid transaction costs. This motivates the 
 
124. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 585. 
125. Id. at 618-19. 
126. Frank B. Cross, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of Civil Justice on the 
American Economy and Policy: Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2002). 
127. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in State 
and Federal Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 459 (2004). 
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need to build new institutions, specifically, forms of private dispute resolution, in 
order to keep the economy growing. 
For the environment, the salient case examples interviewees gave boiled 
down to “We just can’t get it done.” One example concerned a project to 
construct a highway through the mountains. The project was halted when a 
Buddhist nun went on a hunger strike. Similarly, the problems with achieving a 
settlement in the Han River Dam dispute present significant economic concerns. 
There is a need for flood control on the Han River. The water in the river 
originates in North Korea. The watershed provides 20% of the nation’s drinking 
water; its watershed includes Seoul, the capital city that is home to almost a 
quarter of the population. There is flooding, and there are concerns about water 
quality because of the increase in the construction of hotels and restaurants on the 
river’s banks upstream. The government needs to build this dam and cannot get it 
done without some process for addressing conflict. 
In other words, there are significant problems in terms of transportation, land 
use, flood control, water quality, and sustainable development. Korea needs the 
institutional infrastructure for dispute resolution to facilitate building the hard 
infrastructure to solve these problems. Although proposals for either legislation 
or executive orders are framed as public participation and democracy-building, 
there is also an economic justification for private dispute resolution. 
B. Reunification with North Korea 
There are implications for the future reunification of Korea. There is a 
working group that involves representation from the World Bank, the scholarly 
community, South Korea, the United States, and other countries planning for 
reunification. 128  Scholars are considering the experience of reunification in 
Germany. They are examining privatization experiences in Poland, Russia, and 
the Czech Republic. Some observe that North Korea will likely inherit South 
Korea’s legal infrastructure, and that corporate law reforms underway in South 
Korea will aid in the transition of nationalized industry in North Korea to private 
hands. This could generate a new wave of disputes. In Germany, there were 
many claims for natural restitution of nationalized property that were brought by 
heirs of the property owners in both East and West Germany. These claims ended 
up in the courts and required special legislation. There may also be disputes 
arising out of claims to private ownership of property nationalized in North 
Korea. 
There are also implications in the area of labor relations. There is little 
information available on the North Korean economy and work force. However, it 
is foreseeable that reunification accompanied by privatization and the transition 
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to a market economy could prompt a wave of unionism in North Korea. This 
could generate work for the NLRC. 
There are implications for the environment because of development. A 
reunified Korea will need to build a transportation infrastructure between the 
former North and South Korea. There may be anticipation of these potential 
future sources of conflict in the developments of legal infrastructure, both in 
terms of substantive law and institution-building for private dispute resolution in 
South Korea. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Korea is instituting innovations in national governance that are laying the 
groundwork for the next generation of its citizens to participate more 
meaningfully in all the aspects of government decisionmaking that affect their 
lives. These innovations may also contribute to continuing the growth in the 
economy that made the Asian Tigers the envy of the developing world. Private 
dispute resolution is an essential part of this legal infrastructure. 
